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PREEMPTV STRIKES AGAINST NUCLEAR
TERRORISTS AND THEIR SPONSORS:
A REASONABLE SOLUTION
I. INTRODUCTION
On January 17, 1991, at 3:01 A.M. Baghdad time, the first of 114
Tomahawk cruise missiles' and laser-guided bombs fired from F-117A
Stealth fighters2 struck and destroyed their designated targets deep inside
Iraqi territory with phenomenal precision.' Along with military
headquarters and missile sites, Iraq's nuclear reactors and nuclear weapons
production facilities were immediately rendered ineffective. The
1. The Tomahawk TLAM-C cruise missile can be launched from a ship at sea and flies
at 550 MPH at low altitude, and can carry a 1,000 lb. warhead with the ability to strike
targets up to 600 miles away. Stephen Budiansky et al., Air Power's Ultimate Test, U.S.
NEws & WORLD REP., Jan. 28, 1991, at 28. Impact is usually accurate to within 10 feet
of its target. Id. As the cruise missile nears its target, a fish-eye camera activates and
searches for the precise target, photographed in advance by spy satellites and stored in
digital form in the missile's on-board computer. Id. During the missile's flight, a radar
altimeter measures surface features on the ground below and compares them with a route
map that is also programmed into its computer. Id.
2. The F-1 17A Stealth Fighter ("Stealth") is designed so that incoming radar signals
are either deflected or absorbed allowing only a small fraction of the signal to be picked
up at the radar site masking the plane's location. Id. Due to the Stealth's ability to evade
radar, it is the weapon of choice for surprise night attacks. Terry Atlas, Iraq Again
Attacks Tel Aviv, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 20, 1991, at 1. Laser-guided bombs fired from U.S.
Stealth Fighters were so accurate that on-board film showed the bombs plunging down a
narrow air shaft destroying an Iraqi air defense headquarters. Budiansky et al., supra note
1.
3. Budiansky et al., supra note 1. Of the initial 51 targets, cruise missiles accounted
for 50 direct hits. Id. Additionally, laser-guided bombs glide to their impact point by
way of a laser beam aimed at the target by the aircraft. Id. The target is lined up in the
cross hairs of an infrared night-vision sight, "which automatically slues a laser beam onto
the target at the same time an optical detector on the nose of the bomb looks for the
reflected beam and adjusts its glide path by moving tail fins to steer precisely to the
target." Id.
4. On the U.S. precision bombing of Iraq's nuclear reactors, President George Bush
stated: "We have dealt a severe setback to Saddam's nuclear ambitions. Our pinpoint
attacks have put Saddam out of the nuclear bomb-building business for a long time to
come." Larry Stammer, Attacks on Reactors Set a Precedent;Nuclear Weapons: Experts
Question Effects. If Iraq Still Has Uraniumfor Fuel, It Might Be Able to Make a Crude
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preemptive strikes by the Coalition forces eliminated the nuclear option for
Iraq's President Saddam Hussein and forced a successful conclusion to
Operation Desert Storm.5
Although the coalition's targeting plan can be classified as brilliant,6
the Israelis must also be given credit for fathering the concept of
preemptively eliminating a nuclear threat through surgical air strikes. 7 In
June 1981, Iraq's Osirak' nuclear reactor was destroyed by Israeli
preemptive action. 9
Despite the UN's authorization of preemptive action in Operation
Desert Storm,' ° these two major preemptive efforts serve as persistent
reminders that nuclear power has the potential for abuse and that nuclear
weapons are no longer limited to such major world powers as the United
States, the former Soviet Union, France, and Great Britain."
In the past few decades there has been a significant increase in the
number of countries that have obtained nuclear power.' 2 For example,
states such as India, South Africa, and Israel are believed to have joined
the ranks of the nuclear elite. 3 Nuclear arms capability has apparently
become a device sought by governments that seek to be recognized as
powerful players in the world community."
Bomb., L.A. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1991, at A6.

5. Id.
6. See Budiansky et al., supra note 1.

7. See Lexie Verdon, 2-Minute Raid, WASH. POST, June 10, 1981, at Al. Israel's
preemptive air strike on Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor was conducted with such precision
that it lasted only two minutes, severely damaged the reactor and resulted in three
casualties on the ground. Id.
8. Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor was named after Osiris, the Egyptian god of the dead.
Sean Piccoli, The Villain of the Piece;How Saddam Became the Despot We Love to Hate,
WASH. TvMs, Feb. 5, 1991, at El.
9. Verdon, supra note 7, at 1. A former Iraqi pilot who defected from Iraq, after
learning that he was being sought by President Saddam Hussein's secret police, reported:
"All the pilots above the rank of captain from the air defence squadron in charge of
covering the Osirak nuclear reactor, bombed by the Israelis in 1981, had been shot."
Crisis in the Gulf 'Iraqi Pilots Executed for Their Mistakes,' INDEPENDENT (London),

Jan. 30, 1991, at 6.
10. Leonard Doyle et al., Crisis in the Gulf." Last Peace Hopes Flicker Low as
Deadline Nears, INDEPENDENT (London), Jan. 15, 1991, at 1.
11. Istvan Pogany, Nuclear Weapons and Self-Defense in InternationalLaw, 2 CONN.
J. INT'L L. 97, 103 (1986).

12. See id.
13. Id.
14. See generally id.
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Many nation-states, including the United States, are now faced with
the serious problem of dealing with radical states that have attained nuclear
capability and sponsor terrorism against Western governments (and Israel).
Nuclear weaponry in the hands of terrorist organizations escalates the
United States government's war against terrorism to new dimensions.
This Note will analyze the current picture of state-sponsored terrorism
and its impact on international law, focusing primarily on the nations of
Iraq, Libya, Iran, and Syria. Additionally, this Note will justify
preemptive military strikes of exacting precision by the United States
against any radical, terrorist-sponsoring state in possession of a nuclear
device, when such possession is reasonably perceived as a threat to United
States national security.
II. STATE-SPONSORED TERRoRIsM UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Background
State-sponsored terrorism is defined as the deliberate employment of
violence or threat of violence by sovereign states to attain strategic and
political objectives in violation of international law. 15 Experts on terrorism
have documented a current trend in modern terrorism: terrorist strategy
has shifted from spreading fear upon adversaries to inflicting mass
destruction in order to influence a government's decision-making
process. 16 Through mass destruction, modern terrorists seek three major
goals: to demonstrate the inability of governments to protect their citizens,
to force governments to increase internal security restricting their own
citizen's liberties (thus creating a virtual police state), and to exert public
pressure upon the17 attacked state in order to change policy adverse to
terrorist interests.
The terrorist tactic most commonly used to achieve these goals is the
suicide method, intended to inflict great destruction through the sacrifice
of an attacker's life. 8 This tactic, which is prevalent in the Middle East, 9
15. Libyan-Sponsored Terrorism: A Dilemma for Policymakers, Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Security and Terrorism of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess. 82 (1986) (statement of Dr. Yonah Alexander).
16. Ahmed G. Ezeldin, Terrorism in the 1990's: New Strategies and the Nuclear

Threat, 13 INT'L J. CoM. & APPLIED
17. Id. at 9.
18. Id.
19. See id.

CRIM. JUST.

7, 9 (1989).
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is believed to date back to the period A.D. 1090-1124, when Al-Hasan
(born Al-Sabah), founder of the order of the Assassins, gained possession
of the mountain fortress of Alamut (located in Persia), which he used as
a central stronghold for the secret society's reign of terror against its
enemies through assassinations.20 Moreover, the act of giving up one's
life for a cause, shahadat or martyrdom, is an act of significance in
Islam.2" The concept of shahadattraces to Imam Hossein (grandson of the
Prophet Mohammad), who allowed himself and his camp to be massacred
after they were surrounded by the army of Yazid.22 He refused to
surrender and was quoted as having said: "Death is better than life under
oppressors. "23
This once ancient tactic is currently successful for primarily two
reasons. First, defense against such attacks is extremely difficult because
the terrorists have no regard for their own personal safety.24 Second, the
heavy toll on human lives and property resulting from these operations
sends shock waves throughout the public and the government. 25 A good
example of how successful the suicide tactic can be is the bombing of the
United States Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, in 1983.26 This
bombing was severely destructive and was a driving factor in the United
States' withdrawal from Beirut. 27 Given the Islamic Jihad's success
through the use of conventional explosives, a nuclear weapon in the hands
of a radical terrorist group may enable the terrorist to stand on equal
footing with a superpower such as the United States 28 since a radical
20. Id. Stories about Hasan and his fortress are legendary. It is said that he was held

in great reverence by his followers that he was given the title "Saiyidna," meaning "our
lord." Throughout the religion of Islam, assassination is a religious duty performed by
the leaders of certain sects and was widely practiced during ancient times. SHORTER
ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM

136-37 (H.A.R. Gibbs & J.H. Kramers eds., 1965).

21. Mohammad Amjad, Shi'ism and Revolution in Iran, 31 J. CHURCH & ST. 35, 36
(1989).
22. Id.
23. Id. Imam Hossein serves as the symbol of resistance against oppression in the
Shi'ism teachings. Id. Martyrdom "is glorified by emphasizing the necessity of sacrifice
for the sake of freedom and the creation of justice in society." Id. at 36-37.
24. Ezeldin, supra note 16, at 10.

25. Id.
26. Norman Kempster, Vietnam WarLeaves Legacy ofAnguish, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 28,
1985, at 1; Andrew Whitley et al., Caught Both Ways in the Crossfire; The Gulf States
and the War, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1987, at 26.
27. Id.
28. Ezeldin, supra note 16, at 12.
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regime with an ideology as extreme as the Jihad's is less likely to be
deterred from launching a nuclear attack. 29 In other words, the United
States' nuclear deterrent is ineffective against such fanatics.
This
predicament moved many United States officials to support offensive
action against Saddam Hussein's nuclear facilities during Operation Desert
Storm.3 °
B. Responsibility of the Sponsor State
The major challenge in fighting state-sponsored terrorism is holding
the sponsor states accountable for their actions and omissions.3 1 As noted
by Professor Sofaer, establishing responsibility for state-sponsored
terrorism is very difficult.3 2 The greatest terrorist threat comes from those
who are secretly utilized by sponsor states.33 The ability of sponsor states
to hide the training, equipment, support, and instructions given to terrorist
groups enables these groups to inflict greater destruction than would be
possible if they had acted independently. 34
Sponsor states can refuse to enforce domestic law against terrorists
within their borders and instead utilize terrorism to advance their own
29. Lewis A. Dunn, Nuclear Proliferation: What Difference Will It Make?, in

118, 118-20 (Fred Holroyd ed., 1985); Pogany,
supra note 11, at 103.
30. The U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee on December 6, 1990 addressed
President Saddam Hussein's nuclear capability, as well as the possibility of deterring him
from first use while U.S. soldiers were positioned in the Persian Gulf. Former Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, Richard N. Perle stated:
We do know that Saddamn Hussein is doing everything in his power to get a
nuclear weapon as fast as possible. No one can say when he will achieve it.
THINKING ABOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS

On this issue-Iraq's drive for nuclear weapons-there is a facile assumption
that he would be easily deterred from using them. "We deterred the Soviets
all the years of the Cold War," the argument goes, "we can deter Iraq as
well." But why should Saddam Hussein assume, accept, that we will punish
his use of weapons of mass destruction, after all, we did nothing when Iraq
used poison gas.
U.S. Policy in the PersianGulf: Hearingof the Senate ForeignRelations Committee, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 401 (1990) (statement of Richard N. Perle, Former Assistant Secretary
of Defense for International Security Policy).

31.
89, 98
32.
33.

Abraham Sofaer, Terrorism, the Law, and the NationalDefense, 126 MiL. L. 11Ev.
(1989).
Id.
Id.

34. Id.
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policies and interests." Additionally, a few states, such as Lebanon, are
incapable of exercising any authority over terrorists in their countries. 6
In certain areas of Lebanon, particularly West Beirut, the central
government's minimal control results in inadequate personal security for
both its own citizens and foreign visitors. 7 The security situation in
Beirut varies from neighborhood to neighborhood, with some areas
serving as terrorist strongholds."
C. Middle Eastern States Sponsoring Terrorism
Several states in the Middle East sponsor terrorists and even go so far
as to harbor terrorist organizations within their own borders.' Four main
culprits of state-sponsored terrorism are Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Iran.41
Iraq, led by President Saddam Hussein, views terrorism as a useful
tool to further its foreign policy interests.42 Reports from the United
States Department of State indicate that Hussein has permitted at least two
radical Palestinian terrorist organizations to establish their headquarters in
Baghdad. 43 Mohammed Abbas, mastermind of the Achille Lauro
hijacking," and George Habash, a renowned airline hijacker, are free to
35. Id. at 92.
36. Id.
37. Abdellah Bouhabib, How to Reduce the Anarchy in Lebanon, N.Y. TIMES, July 7,
1987, at A26.

38. Id.
39. Mary Curtius, Israel Tough in S. Lebanon, CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR, Jan. 13,
1987, at 1. Former Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin addressed the terrorist
problem in Lebanon: "There is no one way to cope with border terrorism, of the kind that
we suffered from Lebanon for the last 15 years as long as there will be no central
government that will be in control of all Lebanon's territory." Id.
40. U.S. Dep't of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1986, in THE 1987 ANNuAL
ON TERRORISM 395-96 (Yonah Alexander ed., 1989). In 1986, Baghdad also granted safe
haven to some Palestinian terrorists responsible for attacks against the U.S. and Israeli
targets. Id. at 402.
41. Id. at 396-403.
42. Id. at 402.
43. Clifford Krauss, U.S. Warns lraq on Aiding Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14,
1990, at A10.
44. Id. The Achille Lauro was an Italian cruise ship hijacked in the Mediterranean in
October 1985. ld.
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engage in terrorist activity against the United States and its allies with the
blessing of Saddam Hussein.45
The United States Department of State has also identified Libyan
leader Muammar Qadhafi as the forerunner in state-sponsored terrorism,
due also to his "revolutionary philosophy and anti-Western orientation." 4
Experts estimate that Qadhafi sponsors forty terrorist organizations and
operates an annual budget of $70 to $100 million for terrorist attacks
against Western targets. 47 Additionally, the Abu Nidal organization, a
feared Palestinian terrorist group, now operates out of Tripoli.4"
The Syrian government is also a large supporter of terrorists in the
Middle East. Syria overtly provides weapons, operational bases, training
facilities, and a safe haven to a wide variety of terrorist groups, including
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, General Command
("PFLP-GC"), based in Damascus, Syria.49 Additionally, Syria permitted
the Ahmad Jibril organization to train within its borders in 1987 for the
sole purpose of launching terrorist attacks into Israel through the use of
gliders and hot air balloons.50
Even though the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini has departed, Iran
employs a strike force brigade designed to eliminate the common enemies
of Islam.51 It is widely recognized that the United States and its allies are
considered to be the "Great Satan. "2
45. Krauss, supra note 43, at A10.
46. U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 40, at 396.
47. Bruce George, Working Group on Terrorism:FinalReport, in THE 1987
ON TERRORISM 510 (Yonah Alexander ed., 1989).

ANNUAL

48. Elaine Sciolino, U.S. Asks Syria to Curb Group Tied to Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 2, 1989, § 1, at 18. On September 5, 1986, the attempted hijack of Pan Am Flight
73 in Karachi, Pakistan, by four terrorists from Abu Nidal's organization left 21 dead
(two Americans) and 120 wounded. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 40, at 398.
49. U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 40, at 400-01. The United States has requested
that Syria curb the activities of the PFLP-GC which was linked to the December 17, 1988,
Pan Am bombing that killed 270 people. Sciolino, supra note 48. The Department of
Defense has indicated that "the group is a general menace to the world and shouldn't
function in Syria." Id. Syria has denied that the group is involved in terrorism. Id.
50. Israeli COS Interviewed on Syria, and Gaza and Hang Glider Attacks (Israeli
Television Broadcast, Dec. 9, 1987) British Broadcasting Corp., Summary of World
Broadcast, Dec. 11, 1987, available in LEXIS, News Library, BBCSWB File.
51. George, supra note 47, at 515. Iran manages a terrorist training center in the city
of Qum where radicals are given religious, political, and military instruction. Id.
52. See Kurdish Radio Considers Rafsanjani's "Hypocritical"Remarks on Contacts
with USA (Iranian Kurdistan radio broadcast, Feb. 6, 1991), British Broadcasting Corp.,
Summary of World Broadcasts, Feb. 11, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library,
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D. Customary InternationalLaw
International legal scholar Professor Ian Brownlie explains that statesupported terrorism is clearly prohibited under customary international
law. 53 In accordance with custom, a state is liable for the actions of a
terrorist organization when the state participates in terrorist activities or
the state permits or acquiesces in the use of its territory to serve as a base
for terrorist operations.' Under the accomplice theory, a state is
vicariously liable if it acquiesces to terrorist activities within its borders. 55
The domestic laws of all civilized states recognize liability for aiding

and/or abetting another's actions. For example, in both the federal and
state judicial systems in the United States, the general rule is:
[A] person is guilty of a crime, not only when he or she
commits it, but also when he or she does or omits something
for the purpose of aiding another person to commit it or
abets in any way its commission, such as providing the
means, training, facilities, or information that may assist in
or facilitate commission of the proscribed acts. 56

BBCSWB File. The United States is not prepared to re-establish relations with Iran as
long as Iran supports terrorism and does not officially condemn all types of terrorist acts.
Id. Iran's open support of terrorism is evident in events of daily life throughout the

country such as issuing postage stamps in honor of Khaled AI-Islamboli, a fundamentalist
gunman who assassinated Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981. A street in downtown
Tehran is also named after him. Ashraf Fouad, Gulf War Draws Egypt and Iran Closer,
Reuter Libr. Rep., Feb. 8, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, LBYRPT File.
53. Ian Brownlie, InternationalLaw and the Activities of Armed Bands, 7 INT'L &
COmp. L.Q. 712, 729 (1958). "Customary international law" is law that owes its
authority to a gradually developed status derived from repeated practice. JEFFREY
GOLDEN, Force and International Law, in THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 206 (1974).
54. Richard Lillich & John Paxman, State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens
Occasioned by TerroristActivities, 26 AM. U. L. REV. 217, 260 (1977).
55. Gregory F. Intoccia, American Bombing ofLibya: An InternationalLegal Analysis,
19 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 177, 196 (1987). The accomplice theory is defined as:
[O]ne who is in some way concerned or associated in commission of crime;
partaker of guilt; one who aids or assists, or is an accessory. One who is
guilty of complicity in crime charged, either by being present and aiding or
abetting in it, or having advised and encouraged it.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 7 (5th ed. 1983).
56. MODEL PENAL CODE § 206 (1962).
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The radical regimes of Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Iran, with their open
door policies for terrorists, can therefore be regarded as blatant violators
of customary international law.
E. UN CharterArticle 3: "Aggression" and "Armed Bands"
States sponsoring terrorism or harboring terrorists are in violation of
Article 3 of the UN Charter.57 Article 3(g) defines "aggression" as "[t]he
sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of
such gravity as to amount to the acts [of aggression] ... or its substantial
involvement therein.""8 A state that allows terrorist groups to engage in
hostilities from its territory as a base of operations is engaging in a clear
act of aggression. 59 A state that harbors terrorists can no longer rely on
the privilege of sovereignty and is subject to attack, as are the terrorists
it harbors in refuge.'
Moreover, in its Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operationAmong States, the UN
57. David Turndorf, Note, The U.S. Raid on Libya: A ForcefulResponse to Terrorism,
14 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 187, 198 (1988).
58. G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 142, U.N. Doc.
A/9631 (1974). The acts referred to in Article 3 are as follows:
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of
another state, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from
such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory
of another State or part thereof;
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another
State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another
State;
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of
another State;
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or
marine and air fleets of another State;
(e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of
another State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the
conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in
such territory beyond the termination of the agreement;
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the
disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act
of aggression against a third state.
Id.
59. BENJAMIN NETANYAHU, TERRORISM: How THE WEST CAN WIN 211 (Benjamin
Netanyahu ed., 1986).
60. Id.
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explicitly prohibits the sponsorship of terrorism by imposing a duty on
every state to "refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or
participating in .

.

.

terrorist acts in another state or acquiescing in

organized activities within its territory directed toward the commission of
such acts, when the acts

. . .

involve a threat or use of force." 6

The Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind ("Draft Code") incorporates Article 2(6) of the UN Charter,
which establishes a crime for "[tihe undertaking or encouragement by the
authorities of a State of terrorist activities in another State, or the
toleration by the authorities of a State of organized activities calculated to
carry out terrorist acts in another State." 62 Sponsoring and harboring
terrorists may constitute "aggression" and could stand as a violation of the
Draft Code.63 Therefore, the actions of those Middle Eastern states that
choose to sponsor terrorism are clearly in violation of international law
under the UN Charter.
III. THE NUCLEAR THREAT

Quietly, the world's leaders in exporting terrorism, such as Iran and64
Syria, have begun developing their own nuclear weapons programs.
Many countries, including Argentina, have been more than willing to
provide the radical states of the Middle East with nuclear technology. 65
Argentina has negotiated several deals with Algeria to provide assistance
in building nuclear reactors, a development which has United States
officials fearing that Libya's Muammar Qadhafi will eventually gain access
to the technology.' Additionally, Argentina has recently concluded a deal
61. G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc.
A/8028 (1970).
62. Report of the InternationalLaw Commission to the General Assembly, [1951] 2
Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 123, 135, U.N. Doc. A/1858/1951.
63. Brownlie, supra note 53, at 718.
The concept of armed bands is now well established in the literature of
international law, and support for, or, toleration of activities of, such bands is
a fairly constant feature of enumerative and mixed definitions of aggression,
and has secured a place in the Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace.
Id.
64. Richard Kessler, Argentina to Ink Research Reactor Deal Soon with Syria, Says
CNEA, NUCLEONICS WK., May 31, 1990, at 6. Argentina's export of nuclear technology
has gained momentum under President Carlos Menem who is a descendant of Syrian
Islamic immigrants and has close links to several Middle Eastern nations. Id.
65. See id.
66. Richard Kessler, Argentina Expects to Wrap Up Deal with Algeria Laterthis Year,
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with Syria for the sale of a 10-Mw (thermal) pool-type isotope production
reactor and related facilities at a minimum cost of $100 millonY Prior to
Operation Desert Storm, Iraq already had a productive nuclear weapons
program,"6 which consisted of components and technology from at least
sixteen countries, including France, Germany, Italy, and Brazil. 69 With
outside assistance, Iraq had two fully-operational nuclear reactors, namely
the Tammuz-II, supplied by France, and the IRT-2000, built by the Soviet
Union.70 Other nuclear-related facilities included the Saad-16 military
research and development center located in Mosul, Iraq71 and Factory 10,
located near Baghdad, which was believed to utilize gas centrifuge
technology to enrich uranium to levels of weapons-grade quality.72 United
States intelligence reports indicated that Iraq possessed at least twenty-six
pounds of weapons-grade uranium, which could be used to fashion a
Nagasaki-type atomic bomb. 73 Furthermore, some intelligence experts
NUCLEAR FUEL, Oct. 3, 1988, at 6 [hereinafter Kessler, Argentina Expects] (including
training Algerian nuclear technicians, as well as the sale of 1.5 metric tons of uranium

dioxide for a subcritical research facility).

United States officials fear that due to

Algeria's close ties with Qadhafi of Libya that it would give him indirect access to nuclear
technology. Id.
67. Id.
68. Andrew Borowiec, Allies Helped Saddam Build His Arsenal, WASH. TIMES, Feb.
19, 1991, at A7. In preparation for a nuclear war, President Saddam Hussein had nuclear
bomb shelters built beneath government buildings in Baghdad with the help of European
engineers. Lee Hancock, Saddam Has Long Readiedfor the Worst, Experts Say, UPI,
Jan. 30, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, UPI File.
69. Borowiec, supra note 68, at A7
70. Race to Develop a Nuclear Weapon, THE TIMES (London), Jan. 27, 1991
[hereinafter Race]. Iraq's 12.5 kilograms of highly enriched uranium was initially supplied
by France for its Osirak reactor. Id. Moreover, Iraq received shipments of uranium from
Portugal consisting of 120 tons in 1980 and 130 tons in 1981. David K. Willis, How
South Africa and Israel Are Maneuveringfor the Bomb, CHRISTIAN SC. MoNrrOR, Dec.
3, 1981, at 14, 16.
71. Harry Weinstein & William C. Rempel, Iraq Arms: Big Help from U.S.;
Technology Was Sold with Approval and Encouragementfrom the Commerce Department
but Often over Defense Official's Objections, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 13, 1991, at A1. Saad-16
consisted of 82 laboratories working on "missile propellants, ballistics, chemical weapons,
nuclear weapons and composite metals." Id.
72. Thomas W. Lippman, Iraq May Still Have Nuclear Capability, WASH. POST, Jan.
22, 1991, at A18.
73. Stammer, supra note 4. U.S. intelligence officials briefed President Bush during
Operation Desert Storm that Iraq had attained the capability to explode a primitive nuclear
device dropped by aircraft which could cause heavy casualties among allied troops. Race,
supra note 70.
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have speculated that Iraq's atomic fuel may have been spared from allied
bombing during the Gulf War.74
Moreover, some of the Middle Eastern terrorist states either have or
will possess in the very near future the delivery systems capable of
launching a nuclear payload. 7 5 Iraq currently possesses SS-12 missiles
purchased from the Soviet Union which are capable of affecting United
States interests in the Persian Gulf.7 6 Iraq and Libya purchased Brazil's
space rockets (the Sonda I, II and III) right off the assembly line,
providing both these states with surface-to-surface nuclear carrying
means. 77
IV. THE IMMINENCY OF TERRORIST ATTACKS AND THREATS

Each year, there is an increase in the number of terrorist attacks
against United States interests. 78 Not surprisingly, a majority of terrorist
attacks and threats aimed at the United States stem from the Middle East.79
74. Lippman, supra note 72.
75. See Race, supra note 70; see also Willis, supra note 70.
76. An Ill Wind from China to Arabia, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1988, at A26. The SS12 missiles have a 500-mile range and can carry nuclear warheads, which are accurate to
within 600 yards of their target. Bill Gertz, Soviets Sent SS-12 Missiles to Iraq, Turkey
Tells U.S., WASH. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1990, at A8. The Turkish government has reported
that the SS-12 missiles were delivered to Iraq prior to 1987 before the signing of the U.S.Soviet Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty which banned this type of sale. Atlas,
supra note 2. Although there was no reported use of the SS-12 missile during Operation
Desert Storm, Soviet-made Scud missiles were fired by the Iraqis at civilian targets in
Israel and Saudi Arabia. Id. These missiles included the Al-Abbas (560 mile range) and
the Al-Hussein (370 mile range). Michael Gordon, Mideast Tensions; Bush Said to
Question Soviets on Supplying Missiles to Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1990, at A4.
77. Gary Milhollin & Gerard White, The Brazilian Bomb, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 13,
1990, at 10. U.S. officials confirmed reports that Brazil is currently trying to produce a
nuclear-capable missile for Libya and Iraq. Id. Iraq has sent a representative to Brazil
to examine a missile prototype. Id. Libya has offered to finance Brazil's missile
development program in exchange for missiles and technology. Id. William Safire, Stop
the Todeskramer, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1989, at A17.
78. John A. Adam, Cause for Alarm, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1989, at 7 (reviewing
ROBERT KUPPERMAN & JEFF KAMEN, FINAL WARNING:

AVERTING DISASTER IN THE

NEW AGE OF TERRORISM (1989)). In 1988 there were 185 terrorists attacks against
American interests. Id. In October 1987, three Syrian terrorists were apprehended trying
to smuggle bomb parts into Vermont. Id. Terrorist incidents in the United States from
1980-86 comprised 51.9% bombings, 22.2% attempted bombings, and 5.6% actual fire
bombings. FBI Analysis of Terrorist Incidentsin the United States, in THE 1987 ANNUAL
ON TERRORISM 198 (Yonah Alexander ed., 1989).
79. U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 40, at 392. In 1986, 46.5% of all international
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The United States armed forces presence in Saudi Arabia has renewed
determination by Middle Eastern terrorist organizations and their state
sponsors to force the United States to change its policy concerning
terrorist aggression."0 Both Iraq and Iran have called for a holy war
against the United States and other nations that sent forces to Saudi
Arabia.8" Israeli intelligence reports indicate that several Palestinian
organizations are actively planning attacks against the United States on
behalf of Iraq. 2 Increased terrorist threats have prompted the United
States Department of State to issue notices that "some terrorist attack
might be imminent."8" The United States has closely monitored Libya
since June 1984 when Qadhafi announced, "We are capable of exporting
terrorism to the heart of America," and September 1985, when he
proclaimed, "We have the right to fight America, and we have the right
to export terrorism to them .

. .

."

Due to the anti-American sentiment

and the open sponsorship of terrorism displayed by both Hussein and
Qadhafi, many United States officials fear that it is merely a matter of
time before someone such as Hussein supplies his terrorist task forces with
nuclear weapons to carry out military action.85

terrorist incidents occurred in the Middle East. Id.
80. See Joel Brinkley, IsraelisAssert PalestiniansPlan TerrorAttacks for Iraq, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 18, 1990, at AS. Attacks are reported to come from Abu Nidal of the Fatah
Revolutionary Council, Abul Abbas, and Ahmed Jabril of the PFLP-GC. Id. Their
services are being offered free of charge and their goal is to change U.S. policy in the
Gulf. Id.
81. Krauss, supra note 43, at A10; see generallyHow to Answer Iraq's Threats, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 25, 1990, at A26 (reporting Iraq's threats to launch a preemptive strike
against Coalition forces in response to UN economic embargo).
82. Brinkley, supra note 80.
83. Terrorist Threats to U.S. Rise After Countermove on Iraq, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 8,
1990, at 5.
84. Bureau of Public Affairs, Special Report No. 138, U.S. Dep't of State, Libya
Under Qadhafi: A Pattern of Aggression, in 25 I.L.M. 182, 183 (1986). Through
surrogate terrorist groups, Libya has been willing to strike at Western targets at a rate of
one incident per month since April 1986. Libya uses Panama as a terrorist base for its
operations in the Western hemisphere and Cuba as a transportation hub. Robert Pear,
U.S. Again Reports Libyan Role in Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1989, at All. In
1986, Libya fired on and hit the U.S. Coast Guard station on the Italian island of
Lampedusa using two SCUD missiles which covered the 200-mile journey from Libyan
soil. Howard Banks, Lessons from the Gulf War, FoREs, Feb. 18, 1991, at 40.
85. Andrew Rosenthal, Neutralizing Iraq's Threat, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1990, at Al,
A15.
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ANALYSIS OF THE USE OF FORCE BY THE UNITED STATES

This Note does not advocate the obliteration of the current terrorist
states of Iraq or Libya because they seek to acquire nuclear weapons. The
thrust of this Note is that, based on a self-defense doctrine, the United
States is justified in using conventional preemptive surgical strikes against
nuclear facilities in Middle East states sponsoring terrorism when the
weapons-producing capabilities of those facilities pose a threat to United
States national security and interests.
There is no guarantee that a nuclear weapon will never be used once
an unstable terrorist state has achieved nuclear capability. 86 Preventive
measures already in effect are proving to be largely ineffective.8 7
Astonishingly, Iraq had been receiving assistance from German companies
86. On June 23, 1981, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein made an open appeal on
Baghdad radio for assistance in developing an atomic weapon, stating that "any country
in the world which seeks peace and security, respects peoples, and does not wish those
peoples to fall under. . oppression. .. should assist Arabs in one way or another to
obtain the nuclear bomb." Id. at A16. Iraq's eagerness to gain a nuclear weapon and use
it, particularly against Israel, was reflected in the October 4, 1980, issue of the
government daily newspaper Al Gumnur:
It does not stand to reason that this reactor would constitute a danger to Iran,
because Iraq sees the Iranian people with a brotherly regard. It is the Zionist
entity [Israel] which is afraid of the Iraqi nuclear reactor, the Zionist entity
which raised a storm in the world against Iraq's efforts to acquire nuclear
technology and has already threatened that it will not sit with folded arms in
view of these attempts and will act to destroy the Iraqi reactor with all means
at its disposal, because it constitutes a great danger to Israel.
Other Iraqi A-Dispute Developments, Facts on File World News Dig., June 26, 1981,
availablein LEXIS, News Library, FACT File.
87. See Weinstein & Rempel, supra note 71, at 1. On Iraq's ability to rapidly develop
a nuclear arsenal, U.S. Senator Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) stated that it was attributable to
"unbelievable greed . . . and [American] bureaucratic bungling." Id. The U.S.
Department of Commerce approved $1.5 billion in exports of high technology (for
potential military use) to Iraq from 1985-90. Id. Some of these exports were shipped
directly to Iraq's Atomic Energy Commission. Id. In June 1990, the U.S. Customs
Service halted a shipment of high-temperature furnaces to Baghdad because the technology
could be used in nuclear arms development, although Iraq alleged it would be used to
manufacture artificial limbs. Id. In November 1990, a U.S. sting operation prevented
Iraq's receipt of nuclear detonator technology, which was reportedly being sent to the
University of Technology in Baghdad for an aerospace laser project. Id. British
companies from Birmingham, Glasgow, and Coventry were responsible for exporting
nuclear equipment to support Iraq's nuclear program. Allison Little, MP Attacks
"Scandal"of NuclearExports to Iraq, Press Ass'n Newsfile, Feb. 20, 1991, available in
LEXIS, News Library, PANEWS File.
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for its nuclear program as late as November 1990, at the height of a total
economic embargo. 88
Moreover, poor International Atomic Energy Agency ("IAEA")
safeguards may result in an inability to detect nuclear weapons
production. 9 Some countries may even refuse to allow the IAEA to
inspect nuclear facilities in order to monitor conditions.' For example,
IAEA inspectors were denied access to Iran's nuclear facilities during a
two-year period under the Ayatollah Khomeini. 91
A. UN CharterArticle 51: "Self-Defense"
Article 51 of the UN Charter gives nations the right to invoke selfdefense: "[Niothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right
of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against
a Member of the United Nations ... until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security." 92 This
article licenses a state's use of armed force to repel an attack against it.93
The right of self-defense exists until the Security Council takes appropriate
action.' In invoking a successful article 51 self-defense claim, the key
question that must be answered is what constitutes an "armed attack.""
B. The Restrictive View of Self-Defense
Several experts interpret Article 51 of the UN Charter using a
restrictive construction of the words "armed attack," holding that self88. Jill Smolowe, The Arsenal; Who Armed Baghdad, TIME, Feb. 11, 1991, at 34.
89. Other Iraqi A-Dispute Developments, supra note 86.
90. Willis, supra note 70, at 16.
91. Id.
92. Bert V. A. Roling, The Ban on the Use of Force and the U.N.Charter, in THE
CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE 1, 3 (A. Cassese ed., 1986).

93. Id.
94. Marshall Silverberg, InternationalLaw and the Use of Force: May the United
States Attack the Chemical Weapons Plant at Rabata?, 13 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
53, 56 (1990).
95. Jean Combacau, The Exception ofSelf-Defence in U.N. Practice,in THE CURRENT
LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE 9 (A. Cassese ed., 1986). "It [is] impossible
to find a definition of armed attack under Art. 51 either in U.N. practice or in that of its
members." Id. Expert opinions vary as to what constitutes an "armed attack." See
Turndorf, supra note 57, at 217.
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defense can be employed only when a state is physically attacked."
International law expert Dr. Subhas Khare supports this view, stating that
"[t]he members can use force in self-defense only when attacked by arms
and they have this right of self-defense only up to the time the Security
Council becomes
seized of the matter and takes necessary measures in the
97
matter. "
The major criticism adopted by many international legal scholars is
that this interpretation constitutes a "wait and see" approach, requiring a
state to absorb the first blow before it is justified in using force against an
aggressor state.9 This interpretation of article 51 fails to take into account
the capability of mass destruction weapons, such as nuclear weapons.99
By compelling a state to sustain an initial assault in this age, a restrictive
view of article 51 could turn the United Nations charter into a suicide
pact.10o
C. Anticipatory Self-Defense: The Liberal View
A widely recognized customary right of anticipatory self-defense is
also derived from article 51.01 Many scholars agree that article 51
permits the exercise of anticipatory self-defense against an imminent
danger.112 It is contended that this customary right is inherent in all states
and derives from the Caroline case of 1837.103 On December 29, 1837,
a British force from Canada crossed into New York and destroyed a vessel
believed to be supplying rebels in Canada." 4 American Secretary of State
Daniel Webster sent a letter to the British ambassador setting forth the
conditions that must exist to justify a state's use of force in self-defense."05
In his letter, Secretary Webster stated that the necessity of self-defense
96. See DR.
97. Id.

SUBHAS

C.

KHARE, USE OF FORCE UNDER U.N. CHARTER

83-84 (1985).

98. Silverberg, supra note 94, at 86.

99. See id. at 57, 86.
100. PHILLIP C. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 166-67 (1959).
101. See KHARE, supra note 96, at 83, 85-86.
102. Lt. Col. Uri Shoham, The GrenadaIntervention: The Israeli Raid upon the Iraqui
Nuclear Reactor and the Right of Self Defense, 109 ML. L. REV. 191, 199 (1985).
103. Rosalyn Higgins, The Attitude of Western States Towards Legal Aspects of the
Use of Force, in THE CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE 442 (A.

Cassesse ed., 1986).
104. Destruction of the "Caroline," 2 Moore DIGEST § 217, at 409-10.

105. Id. at 412.
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must be "instant, overwhelming and leaving no choice of means and no
moment for deliberation."" Since Webster's letter, the customary right
of anticipatory self-defense has required that the elements of necessity and
proportionality be met.107 The Carolinestandard is the classic test adopted
by Western nations.108
The "necessity" element of anticipatory self-defense is comprised of
various factors, including "the nature of coercion applied by the opposing
side, the relative size and power of the rivals, the nature of their
objectives and the consequences if the objectives are achieved, [and] the
expectation of effective community intervention .

. . .

A terrorist

threat to a state's safety and security is also considered in determining the
necessity of anticipatory self-defense."' The necessity element has been
interpreted by some experts to mean that a right to anticipatory selfdefense exists where it can be shown that a state is faced with imminent
danger."' These experts believe that a truly imminent danger is posed by
an oncoming nuclear attack." 2
106. Id.
107. Oscar Schachter, The Lawful Resort to UnilateralUse ofForce, 10 YALE J.INT'L
L. 291, 292 (1985).
108. Higgins, supra note 103, at 442. The UN's failure to condemn or disapprove of
Israel's preemptive strike against Egyptian planes on May 6, 1967, provides a good
example of the West's acceptance of the Caroline formula. Id. at 442-43. Israel attacked
Egypt after it requested that the United Nations remove its peace-keeping force, which
were protecting the Straits of Tiran (Israel's only link to the outside world). Id. At the
same time, over 100,000 Syrian troops amassed on the Syrian-Israeli border. Id.
Consequently, the West viewed this strike as a lawful use of anticipatory self-defense in
accordance with Caroline criteria. Id.
109. Shoham, supra note 102, at 193.
110. Mark B. Baker, Terrorism and the Inherent Right of Self-Defense (A Call to
Amend Article 51 of the United Nations Charter), 10 Hous. J. INT'L L. 25, 42 (1987).
111. GOLDEN, supra note 53, at 201.

112. See

WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL

LAW 259-261(1964).
The ability of missiles with nuclear warheads, to paralyse and destroy the
nerve centres even of vast countries such as the U.S.S.R. or the U.S.A., and
to kill or maim major parts of their populations in one blow, may make it a
form of suicide for a state to wait for the actual act of aggression before
responding .... [T]he right of self-defence must probably now be extended
to the defence against a clearly imminent aggression, despite the apparently
contrary language of Article 51 of the Charter.
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The second element of the anticipatory self-defense doctrine is that of
Simply stated, the force used by a state
proportionality. 1"
must be proportionate to the amount of force it would be subject to from
the aggressor state. 1 14 For example, a state that is alerted to an upcoming
border raid by an attacker using conventional weapons is not justified to
use nuclear weapons in anticipatory self-defense against its enemy.
The imminency standard, as used to determine "necessity," has been
vehemently criticized. International law expert Professor W.T. Mallison,
Jr. best expressed this criticism of the Carolineformula: "The formulation
was probably unrealistically restrictive when stated in 1841. In the
contemporary era of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons and rapid missile
delivery techniques, Secretary Webster's formulation could result in5
national suicide if it was actually applied instead of merely repeated.""
The time gap between a potential threat and an actual attack may constitute
no time at all. The imminency requirement is ineffective because in the
preparatory stages of a nuclear missile attack there are no readily
observable signs that the attack is pending.1 16 Not even the superpowers
are believed to have the capability to determine whether a nuclear attack
is imminent. 17 The United States, Great Britain, and Israel, with their
sophisticated surveillance equipment, have notably failed on occasion to
discover that even a conventional attack was impending." 8 If conventional
113. See IAN

BROWNLEE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES

261 (1963) (discussing Webster's insistence on proportionate measures).
114. Id.; Shoham, supra note 102, at 193-94.
115. W.T. Mallison, Jr., Limited Naval Blockade or QuarantineInterdiction:National
and Collective Defense Claims Valid Under InternationalLaw, 31 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
335, 348 (1962). Another fear is that "an error in calculation or intelligence may lead a
nuclear [plower to start a war of universal extermination, from a posture of self defense.
FRIEDMANN, supra note 112, at 259.
116. Pogany, supra note 11, at 106.
117. Id. at 105. U.S. early-warning sensors (satellites) have been criticized as
ineffective because they scan the sky at a very slow rate and advance notice can be as little
as 30 to 90 seconds. Banks, supra note 84, at 40. Moreover, due to U.S. Congressional
budget cuts in 1989, long distance communications were restricted, resulting in a "weak
point in the [U.S.] early-warning system." John H. Cushman, Jr., Air Force Is Facing
Critical Gap in Combat Readiness, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1988, at A16.
118. Pogany, supra note 11, at 105. In early warning systems, there is also the
problem of human error which was the primary reason for damage inflicted on the U.S.S.
Stark (from an Iraqi fighter in 1987) and at Pearl Harbor during World War II. Fatal
Distraction, ECONOMIST, July 16, 1988, at 79. In May 1987, 37 U.S. sailors were killed
aboard the U.S.S. Stark after two low-flying French-built Exocet missiles were fired from
an Iraqi war plane. U.S. to Sell Brazil Phalanx Guns to Protect Ships, Reuter Lib. Rep.,
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attacks can remain undetected until commenced, surely a subversive
terrorist organization planning to detonate a nuclear device would be
extremely difficult to uncover.
D. Anticipatory Self-Defense: Reasonableness Standard
Rather than being held to a self-defense standard based on custom
where the right to act in anticipatory self-defense is permitted only if there
is imminent danger, nations should be held to a standard of
reasonableness. " 9 A popular view gaining wide acceptance among legal
scholars is to give nations the right to anticipatory self-defense "when a
state reasonably perceives a significant threat to its national security and
responds to that threat in a reasonable manner."120 According to
international law expert Professor Westlake, "a State may defend itself by
preventive means, if in its conscientious judgment [such means are]
necessary against attack by another state, threat of attack, or preparation
or other conduct from which an intention to attack may reasonably be
apprehended.""' The reasonableness standard is best defined by legal
scholar Professor Mallison: "[A] target state is authorized to act
unilaterally in self-defense when it reasonably expects that it must use the
military instrument of national policy to preserve its physical integrity and
continued existence as an effective participant in the world community
processes."122 Therefore, the key justification for a state engaging in
preemptive military action in self-defense against an aggressor state is that
it acted reasonably in an effort to preserve its physical12 integrity and to
ensure its continued existence in the world community.
The legitimacy of a preemptive military strike under this view of
anticipatory self-defense is based on the capability of the weapons
involved, the reaction time, and the strategic situation. 2 4 The past actions
of the aggressor are also taken into consideration in determining whether
the preemptive action is reasonable.121 In order to determine whether
June 28, 1988, available in LEXIS, News Library, LBYRPT File.
119. Beth M. Polebaum, Note, National Self-Defense in International Law: An
Emerging Standardfor a Nuclear Age, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 187, 208 (1984).
120. Silverberg, supra note 94, at 58.
121. J.WESTLAKE, 1 INT'L LAw. 299 (1904).
122. Mallison, Jr., supra note 115, at 360.

123. Shoham, supra note 102, at 194.
124. Id. at 195.

125. Polebaum, supra note 119, at 210.
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preemptive military action by the United States against a terrorist state
possessing nuclear weapons is reasonable, it is best to analyze the abovelisted factors in a scenario based upon current trends in the Middle East.
1. The Scenario
A terrorist Middle East nation such as Iraq or Libya, through the use
of its many channels of international trade, obtains sufficient nuclear
technology to build its own nuclear arsenal. There is no reason to assume
that these terrorist states will abandon their sponsorship of the various
terrorist organizations that are used to forge their foreign policy in the
Middle East and the rest of the world. Additionally, the sponsored
terrorist attacks against the United States, based on suicide tactics,
continue to pose a serious threat to national security. Moreover, a radical
terrorist organization such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine, General Command is secretly given a nuclear weapon by the
sponsor state to use against the United States, either against American
armed forces positioned in the Persian Gulf or for detonation at a strategic
location on American soil. The PFLP-GC or other radical group,
including the sponsor state, does not fear the effects of the United States
nuclear deterrence policy,' 26 because it knows of difficulty in proving who
conducted the terrorist attack, 27 as well as the actual chain of custody of
the weapon from the sponsor to the terrorists. 28 A second nuclear strike,
by the United States against the suspected terrorist sponsor, is likely to
draw heavy criticism from the world community. Studies show that a
nuclear attack on a single city would result in 200,000 to 2,000,000
immediate deaths.129 Such devastation will be difficult to condone even for
those states that support retaliation. Finally, even if the United States does
retaliate with its own nuclear strike or a conventional strike, the reprisal
is too late; mass devastation to vital interests has already occurred.
2. The Solution
As long as Middle Eastern nations that choose to sponsor extremists
continue their support of attacks against the United States, then as soon as
these nations achieve the ability to produce nuclear weapons and the threat
126.
127.
128.
129.

Pogany, supra note 11, at 103.
Sofaer, supra note 31, at 98.
See id. (explaining how states that sponsor terrorism evade responsibility).
Polebaum, supra note 119, at 214 n.144.
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of their use seems reasonably imminent, the United States should conduct
a precise surgical military strike using conventional weapons against the
nuclear facilities to eliminate the nuclear threat and avoid potential
catastrophe.
3. The Analysis: Reasonableness Standard
The capability of a nuclear weapon is common knowledge. 3 ' It is
without question the most powerful and devastating weapon known to
man. Even the threatened use of a weapon of this magnitude should
prompt all nations to take whatever action necessary to prevent its use.
International legal scholar Professor Fenwick addresses the legitimacy of
preemptive action to prevent a nuclear attack:
[T]he nature of the weapons involved and the capability of
the opponent to use them effectively are significant factors
[I]t can be argued that, if there is enough evidence to
. ...
show that the other side is planning an attack using weapons
of mass destruction, the right of self-defense may be
invoked, even though the exact date of the expected attack
is unknown.'
The Atomic Energy Commission has also adopted the position that
anticipatory self-defense is justified due to the magnitude of destruction
inherent in nuclear weapons. 32 "[Pireparations for atomic warfare . . .
power of the weapon, have to be treated
would, in view of the appalling
33
as an 'armed attack.''
The reaction time involved in a terrorist nuclear attack may preclude
any useful warning to the United States if it were to become a nuclear
target. 34 The primary reasons are that terrorist groups operate
clandestinely-sponsored factions operate under the blanket protection of
a so-called legitimate government' 35-and that nuclear delivery systems are
130. See generally id. (explaining the damage associated with a nuclear first strike).
131. Shoham, supra note 102, at 204.
132. WALDOCK, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in
International Law 498 (1952).

133. Id.
134. See generally Cushman, Jr., supra note 118, at A16 (discussing the United States'
diminished ability to detect nuclear weapons in light of cuts in the defense budget).
135. See Sofaer, supra note 31, at 98. See supra text accompanying note 129.
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swift and have the capacity to operate undetected, despite sophisticated
surveillance and detection systems.
The strategic relevance of a terrorist strike would most likely depend
on which target the nuclear terrorists seek to attack. For instance, the
Cuban Missile Crisis was considered to be of great strategic significance
because many nations perceived the mere positioning of nuclear weapons
on the soil of a political enemy to be a "genuine and direct threat" to the
United States. 36 If the placement of nuclear weapons can be considered
a "genuine threat" with strategic importance, an actual nuclear attack must
have an even greater significance.
The prior actions and current trends of these Middle Eastern terrorist
groups indicate that the United States is, and will continue to be, their
enemy. 137 Their ideology is unchangeable as long as the "Great Satan"138
(the United States) continues its presence in the Persian Gulf. 3 9 The past
decade has witnessed several destructive attacks against the United States
and its interests, such as the Marine barracks bombing in Lebanon in
1983,140 the West Berlin disco bombing in 1986,' and the downing of
Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988.142 With increasing threats from figures such
as Saddam Hussein and Muammar Qadhafi, the United States may
reasonably expect a terrorist nuclear attack once the terrorist groups they
support are in possession of a device. Therefore, a preemptive military
strike to avert nuclear disaster is a reasonable solution under the
circumstances. In accordance with Professor Mallison's definition of
reasonableness, eliminating a nuclear threat under these conditions will
ensure that the physical integrity of the United States is preserved as well
as allow the United States to maintain its position in the world
community. ""

136. See Higgins, supra note 103, at 439.
137. See Brinkley, supra note 80 (discussing Palestininan terrorist organizations' plans
to attack American targets).
138. Kurdish Radio Considers Rafsanjani's "Hypocritical"Remarks on Contacts with
USA, supra note 52.
139. See generally Brinkley, supra note 80 (discussing terrorist plans to attack
American facilities in the Persian Gulf).

140. Id.
141. U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 40, at 396.
142. Stephen Engelberg, U.S. Suspects Iran Unit in the Pan Am Bombing, N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 25, 1989, at A6.
143. Mallison, Jr., supra note 115, at 360.
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E. Fighting State-Sponsored Terrorism
Due to the destructiveness and frequency of terrorist attacks, there is
a trend among legitimate nations to eliminate terrorism at all costs, as
noted by legal scholar Oscar Schachter:
Strong public revulsion against terrorism has spurred
increased demands for concerned states to deny all sanctuary
to terrorists. Proposals have been made that the United
States (and presumably any capable state) be permitted to
seize accused terrorists from within states which fail to bring
them to justice. Moreover, under these proposals every
state could determine unilaterally its right to take action
against a person it believes guilty. This of course represents
a radical departure from the basic rule of territorial
sovereignty.144
The United States policy against terrorism reflects this trend and
depicts a determination to eliminate terrorist threats against American
interests. 145 The Vice President's 1986 Task Force on Combatting
Terrorism, headed by former President Bush, outlined the United States
policy on fighting terrorism.' 46 The policy is as follows: (1) The United
States is opposed to all forms of terrorism and is prepared to act
"unilaterally if necessary to prevent or respond to terrorist acts; "147 (2) the
United States considers the practice of terrorism to be a "threat to its
national security and will resist terrorist efforts through all legal means
available;"1 4' and (3) nations that practice or actively support terrorism
must suffer the consequences. 14 If the United States has evidence that a
state is mounting or intends to engage in terrorism against American
interests, then it will take appropriate measures to protect its citizens,
property, and interests. 5 '
144. Oscar Schachter, In Defense of InternationalRules on the Use of Force, 53 U.
CHI. L. REv. 113, 140-41 (1986).
145. Public Report of the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism 7
(Feb. 1986).

146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.

150. Id.
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Israel's former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Shimon Peres, advised
the United States government on how to effectively combat state-sponsored
terrorism.'-" Peres described the link between sponsor states and the
terrorist organizations as the "Achilles heel" to international terrorism. 152
He argued that, in order to effectively sever the tie, the United States must
deter the sponsor states, penetrate their channels of communication and
assistance to these organizations, and take an effective military response
to the terrorists themselves. '
In taking an active role in neutralizing terrorism, in other words
adopting the reasonableness approach to anticipatory self-defense, the
United States will be enforcing its moral right and duty to defend itself
from terrorist aggression. " Through the bombing of Libyan terrorist base
camps in 1986155 and through the State Department's warnings to Iraqi
leader Saddam Hussein, 56 the United States has sent a message to the
world community that terrorist actions will be dealt with through
preemptive military action.
VI. CONCLUSION

With increasing threats and terrorist attacks against the United States
and its interests from radical-sponsored terrorist organizations, the United
States government must be willing to hold the sponsor states accountable
for their actions. Employment of suicide tactics by Middle Eastern
terrorist groups, coupled with their sponsor states' determination to obtain
a nuclear arsenal, heightens concerns that the United States will eventually
become a nuclear target.
151. See Shimon Perez, The Fight Against International Terrorism: A Challenge to the
Democracies, Statement at Conference on Terrorism in a Technological World,
Washington, D.C. (Jan. 22, 1987), in THE 1987 ANNUAL ON TERRORISM 385 (Yonah

Alexander ed., 1989).
152. Id. at 386.
153. Id.
154. Secretary George Shultz, Terrorism and the Modern World, Address Before the
Park Avenue Synagogue, New York (Oct. 25, 1984), in UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
OF STATE, BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS 5 (1984).
155. See Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the United States' Air
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Due to the mass destructive capability of these weapons, the United
States is justified in adopting a preemptive strategy in order to avert
nuclear catastrophe. As long as the United States acts reasonably in
anticipating a nuclear strike from state-sponsored terrorists, the United
States is justified in using precise conventional raids, such as those
conducted during the air campaign of Operation Desert Storm, against the
nuclear facilities of the sponsor state or the terrorists in accordance with
international law.
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